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Abstract. In this paper, we aim to investigate the superiority and practicability of many-
parameter wavelet transforms (MPWT) from the physical layer security (PHY-LS) perspective. 
We propose novel Intelligent OFDM-telecommunication system (Intelligent-OFDM-TCS), 
based on many-parameter wavelet transform (MPWT). New system uses inverse MPWT for 
modulation at the transmitter and direct MPWT for demodulation at the receiver. The purpose 
of employing the MPTs is to improve the PHY-LS of wireless transmissions against to the 
wide-band anti-jamming communication. Each MPWT depends on finite set of independent 
Jacobi parameters (angles), which could be changed independently one of another. When 
parameters are changed, multi-parametric transform is changed too taking form of a set known 
(and unknown) orthogonal (or unitary) wavelet transforms.  
We implement the following performances as bit error rate (BER), symbol error rate (SER), 
peak to average power ratio (PAPR), the Shannon-Wyner secrecy capacity (SWSC) for novel 
Intelligent-MPWT-OFDM-TCS. Previous research has shown that the conventional OFDM 
TCS based on discrete Fourier transform (DFT) has unsatisfactory characteristics in BER, 
PARP, SWSC and in anti-eavesdropping communications. We study Intelligent-MPWT-
OFDM-TCS to find out optimal values of angle parameters of MPWT optimized BER, PAPR, 
SWSC, anti-eavesdropping effects. Simulation results show that the proposed Intelligent 




Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) has been widely employed in modern wireless 
communications networks. Unfortunately, conventional OFDM signals are vulnerable to malicious 
eavesdropping and jamming attacks due to their distinct time and frequency characteristics. The 
communication that happens between the two legitimate agents needs to be authorized, authentic and 
secured. Hence, in order to design a secured communication, we need a secret key that can be used to 
encode the data in order to be prevented from phishing. So, there is a need to generate a secret key 
with the existing information available. This key should not be shared as the wireless channel remains 
vulnerable to attack. So, the key should be generated by both the communicating legitimate agents. 
Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms/protocols implemented at upper layers of the open systems 
interconnection (OSI) protocol stack, have been widely used to prevent information disclosure to 
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unauthorized users. However it has its own demerits. To overcome its issues we can use key 
generation techniques based on many-parameter wavelet transform (MPWT) instead of discrete 
Fourier transform (DFT) in OFDM communications. 
In this paper, we propose a simple and effective anti-eavesdropping Intelligent OFDM system, based 
on MPWT 1 22 ( , ,..., )n qϕ ϕ ϕWT  [1]-[2]. MPWT has the form of the product of the sparse Jacobi 
rotation matrixes and it describes fast algorithms for MPWT. The purposes of employing the MPWT: 
• is to study the influence of parameters 1 2, ,..., qϕ ϕ ϕ  on the transmission performances of 
OFDM-TCS, 
• is to improve the PHY-LS of wireless transmissions against to the wide-band anti-jamming 
and anti-eavesdropping communication. 
• is to minimize the peak to average power ratio (PAPR), the bit error rate (BER) and symbol 
error rate (SER) performances with respect to the conventional OFDM-TCS, based on fast 
Fourier transform (FFT), 
Each MPWT 1 22 ( , ,..., )n qϕ ϕ ϕWT  depends on finite set of independent Krylov-Jacobi (or Euler-Jacobi) 
parameters (angles 1 2, ,..., qϕ ϕ ϕ ), which could be changed independently one of another. When 
parameters are changed, sub-carriers, corresponding to multi-parametric transform, are changed too 
taking form of all known (and unknown) orthogonal sub-carriers that transmit useful information. For 
this reason, the concrete values of parameters 0 0 01 1 2 2, ,..., q q= = =ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ  are specific “key” for entry 
into OFDM-TCS. Vector 1 2( , ,..., )qϕ ϕ ϕ  of parameters belong to q -D torus space [0,2 )
qπ . For 
(2 2 )n n× -MPT 1 22 ( , ,..., )n qϕ ϕ ϕWT  q  is equal to 
1( 2 )nn −O . If, for example, 10n =  ( 102 1024= ), then 
the torus [0,2 )qπ  will have dimension 910 2 5120⋅ =  (it is not 1-D radio frequency axis in the Fourier 
analyses!). Scanning of the space 5120[0,2 )π  for find out the “key” (the concrete values of parameters 
0 0 0
1 1 2 2, ,..., q q= = =ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ) is a hard problem. The process of generating a “key” (parameters) of 
MPWT can be more efficient in terms of providing security as compared to RSS based technique. This 
technique generates the “key” in periodical manner (known legitimate communication agents) thereby 
preventing the attacker (eavesdropper and jammer).   
Our network model protector consists of a legitimate transmitter (Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob). 
Suppressor is an adversary attacker (Eve). Eva is always in line of sight of both Alice and Bob. Aim of 
the attackers are to eavesdroppe (Eve) legitimate packets sent between Alice and Bob when required. 
We intend to demonstrate the network performance of Intelligent-OFDM-TCS based on MPT 
1 22
( , ,..., )n qϕ ϕ ϕWT  under eavesdropping attack, which are constituted by Eve. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we propose effective 1 22 ( , ,..., )n qϕ ϕ ϕWT -based defense 
mechanisms to counteract eavesdropping attack in the electronic warfare (EW), in next two sections 
we study Intelligent 1 22 ( , ,..., )n qϕ ϕ ϕWT -OFDM-TCS to find out optimal values of parameters 
optimized PARP, BER, SER, anti-eavesdropping (section 3). 
2. Many-parameter wavelet transforms 
2.1. The system model 
The system model that is going to be used in this work is know as the wiretap channel model, which 
was introduced by Schannon [3] and Wyner [4]. It is presented in Fig.1. This model is composed of 
two legitimate users, named Alice and Bob, while the passive an eavesdropper named Eve attempts to 
eavesdrop the information. A legitimate user (Alice) transmits her confidential messages to a 
legitimate receiver (Bob), while Eve is trying to eavesdrop Alice’s information. We suppose that the 
eavesdropper knows frame of OFDM signal of the legitimate Intel-OFDM-TCS (knows 
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0 0 0
1 22
( , ,..., )n qϕ ϕ ϕWT  with  
initial values of parameters ( )0 0 01 2, ,..., qϕ ϕ ϕ  at the time 0t ) and has the 
capability to demodulate OFDM signals. Hence, the legitimate transmitter/receiver (Alice/Bob) and 
eavesdropper (Eva) use identical parameters of Intel-OFDM-TCS which remain constant over several 
time slots. 








i.e. she use the 
MPWT 0 0 01 22 ( , ,..., )n qϕ ϕ ϕWT  with fixed parameters 
0 0
1 ,..., qϕ ϕ . When sub-carriers 






ϕ ϕ  (i.e. unitary transform 0 0 01 22 ( , ,..., )n qϕ ϕ ϕWT  of Alice’s and Bob’s Intelligent-
OFDM-TCS are identified by Eva this TCS can be eavesdropped by means of radio-electronic 
eavesdropping attack. 
In this scenario, Bob and Eve will have the same instruments to decode the received message. 
Therefore, the signals received by Bob and Eva are given by 
A A A( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])1 0 0 0
(B,E| ) 1 22
( , ,..., ) ,l l ln q
−
ξ = + = ϕ ϕ ϕ +
B B Br s ξ Z ξWT  
and then process they by  0 0 01 22 ( , ,..., )n qϕ ϕ ϕWT -transform 
A A A( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])0 0 0 0 0
(B,E| ) 1 2 (B,E| ) 12
( , ,..., ) ( ,..., ) ,l l ln q qξ ξ= ϕ ϕ ϕ = + ϕ ϕ
B B BR r Z ΞWT  
where 0 0 0 0 01 1 22( ,..., ) ( , ,..., ) ,q n qϕ ϕ = ϕ ϕ ϕΞ ξWT ( )20 1 1, ,..., 0,N −ξ ξ ξ ∈ σCN  is thermal noise, which is 
modeled as a discrete–time additive complex white Gaussian process (ACWGNP) with a zero mean 
and 2jamσ  variance. This means that Eve intercepts Alice’s message successful. 
 
Figure 1. Eavesdropping attack. 
 
As an anti-eavesdropping measure Alice and Bob can use the following strategy:  they select new sub-
carriers in Intelligent-OFDM-TCS by changing parameters of 1 0 0 01 22 ( , ,..., )n q
− ϕ ϕ ϕWT  in the periodical (or 
pseudo random) manner (a priory known for Alice and Bob) 
( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 01 2 1 2 1 1 2 2, ,..., , ,..., , ,..., ,rT rT rT rT rT rTq q q qϕ ϕ ϕ → ϕ ϕ ϕ = ϕ + ∆ϕ ϕ + ∆ϕ ϕ + ∆ϕ  
0,1,2,... r = , where ( )0 0 01 2, ,..., qϕ ϕ ϕ  are initial values of parameters at the initial time 0t ,  T  is the 
period of changing parameters. 
If eavesdropping attack is happened on *r -th period ( *r -th time slot) then in next periods *r r>  the 
signals received by Bob and Eva are given by 
A A A( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])1
(B,E| ) 12
( ,..., ) .l l lrT rTn q
−
ξ = + = ϕ ϕ +
B B Br s ξ Z ξWT  
But they are processed by different MPTs: by MPT ( ) 12 2 ( ,..., )
r rT rT
n n q= ϕ ϕWT WT  (Bob) and by MPT 
( *) * *
12 2
( ,..., )r r T r Tn n q= ϕ ϕWT WT  (Eve), i.e.,  
     
( )A A A
A A
1
( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])( ) ( ) ( )
(B| ) (B,E| )2 2 2
( [ ]) ( [ ])( )
12
( ,..., ) ,
l l lr r r
n n n




 = = + =  
= + = + ϕ ϕ
B B B
B B
R r Z ξ
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and 







( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])( *) ( *) ( *)
(E| ) (B,E| )2 2 2
1
( [ ]) ( [ ])( *) ( ) ( *) ( *, ) * *
12 2 2
( [ ]) * *
E 1
( ,..., )
( ,..., ) ,
l l lr r r
n n n
l lr r r r r r T r T
n n N n q





 = = + =  
= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ + ϕ ϕ =




R r Z ξ
Z ξ Z Ξ
Z Ξ
WT WT WT
WT WT U WT
 
where 
     
( )
1 12
( ,..., ) ( ,..., )rT rT r rT rTq n qϕ ϕ = ϕ ϕ ⋅Ξ ξWT , 
* * ( *) * *
1 12
( ,..., ) ( ,..., )r T r T r r T r Tq n qϕ ϕ = ϕ ϕ ⋅Ξ ξWT , 




B BZ ZU ( ) 1( *, ) ( *) ( )2 2 2r r r rn n n
−
= ⋅WT WT WT . 
Both Bob and Eva give the following estimations  
( ) ( )
A A A( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])
1B| B|
ˆ ( ,..., ) ,l l l rT rTq   = = +  




( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ]) * *
(E| ) (E| ) 1
( [ ])( *, ) * *
12
ˆ ( ,..., )
( ,..., )
l l l r T r T
E q
lr r r T r T
n q
  = = + =   
 = + 
B B B
B
Z MLA R MLA Z Ξ
MLA Z Ξ
ξ ξ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕWT
 
using the maximum-likelihood algorithm (MLA). In thermal noiseless case (i.e., 1( ,..., )
rT rT
qΞ ϕ ϕ =0 
and * *1( ,..., )
r T r T
qΞ ϕ ϕ =0), we have 
A A( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])
B
ˆ ,Al l l = ≡ 
B B BZ MLA Z Z  
A A A A( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ]) ( [ ])( *, )
E E 2
ˆ .l l l lr rn  = = ≠   
B B B BZ MLA Z MLA Z ZWT  
Bob’s and Eva’s estimations of bit streams are given by the following algorithm  
{ } { }
{ } { }
A A
A A
( [ ]) ( [ ])1 1
(B,A| ) (B| )
( [ ]) ( [ ])1 1 ( *, )










 = = + 
 = = ⋅ + 
B B
B B
B CM Z CM MLA Z Ξ









( [ ]) ( [ ])1 1
B,A A
( [ ])1 ( *, )
E,A A B2
ˆ [ ] [ ] ,








 = = ≡ 
 = ⋅ ≠ = 
B B
B
B CM MLA Z CM Z B
B CM MLA Z B BWT
 
if noise is missing. We see that Alice&Bob’s anti-eavesdropping measure is successful, since  
( ) ( )(E,A| ) (B,A| ) (B,A| ) Aˆ ˆ ˆ[ ] [ ] & [ ] [ ]l l l l≠ ≅B B B Bξ ξ ξ  
with noise and 
( ) ( )E,A B,A B,A Aˆ ˆ ˆ[ ] [ ] & [ ] [ ] ,l l l l≠ ≡B B B B  
in noiseless case.  
The works by Schannon [3] and by Wyner [4] introduced the concept of “secrecy capacity” as a metric 
for physical layer security. This metric for the thl  time-slot can be formulated as shown in the 
following equation ˆ ˆ( | ) ( ; | ) ; | )[ ] Inf [ ] Inf [ ],A B A ESec l l l= −B B (B BC ξ ξ ξ  
where ( ) ( )
A B A E
1 1
ˆ ˆA (B| ) A (E| )( ; | ) ( ; | )
0 0
ˆ ˆInf [ ] [ ] [ ]   and  Inf [ ] [ ] [ ]  
s sdN dN
r r r r
r r
l b l b l l b l b l
− −
= =
= ≡ = ≡∑ ∑B B B Bξ ξξ ξ
 
stand for the 
mutual information between the sent message and the messages received by Bob and Eve (with noise), 
respectively. In noiseless case, we have 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; )[ ] Inf [ ] Inf [ ] Inf [ ],A Bob A E A ESec sl l l dN l= − = −B B B B B BC  
where { }
A B A B
ˆ ˆ( ; ) ( ; )Inf [ ] max Inf [ ]sl dN l= ≡B B B B  and ( )A E
1
ˆ A E( ; )
0




l b l b l
−
=
= ≡∑B B .     
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Generally speaking, this metric allows knowing the amount of information in the received message by 
Bob, ( )10B B B B Bˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ [ ] [ ],..., [ ],..., [ ]sdNrl b l b l b l−= =B B  coinciding with the amount of information contained 
in the sent by Alice message  ( )10A A A A A[ ] [ ],..., [ ],..., [ ]sdNrl b l b l b l−= =B B .  We will call this measure the “bit 
secrecy capacity” and denote as 
 ˆ ˆ( | ) ( ; | ) ; | )[ ] Inf [ ] Inf [ ],A B A E
Bit Bit Bit
Sec l l l= −B B (B BC ξ ξ ξ                                           (1) 
where ˆ ˆ( ; | ) ( ; | )Inf [ ] Inf [ ],A B A B
Bit l l=B B B Bξ ξ  and ˆ ˆ; | ) ; | )Inf [ ] Inf [ ].A E A E
Bit l l=(B B (B Bξ ξ  Along with this measure, we 
introduce the “symbol secrecy capacity” 
ˆ ˆ( | ) ( ; | ) ; | )[ ] Inf [ ] Inf [ ],A B A E
Sym Sym Sym
SecC l l l= −B B (B Bξ ξ ξ                                          (2)                                
where  [ ] [ ]( ) [ ] [ ]( )
1 1
ˆ ˆA (B| ) A (E| )( ; | ) ; | )
0 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆInf [ ]   and  Inf [ ] .
s s
A B A E
N N
Sym r r Sym r r
r r
l l l l l l
− −
= =
= = = =∑ ∑B B (B Bb b b bξ ξξ ξ  
Note, that transmit A[ ]lB  and received B Eˆ ˆ[ ] , [ ]l lB B  messages depend on parameters 1( ,..., )
rT rT
qϕ ϕ  
and * *1( ,..., )
r T r T





− ϕ ϕU  and  
1 * *
1( ,..., )
r T r T
N q
− ϕ ϕU , respectively: 
A A 1 B B 1
* *
E E 1 1
ˆ ˆ[ ] [ | ( ,..., )] ,   [ ] [ | ( ,..., )] ,
ˆ ˆ[ ] [ | ( ,..., );( ,..., )] ,
rT rT rT rT
q q
rT rT r T r T
q q




B B B B
B B
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
 
Hence, ( | )[ ]Sec lC ξ  and ( | )[ ]
Sym
Sec lC ξ  depend on the same parameters 
* *
( | ) 1 1
* *
ˆ ˆ1 1 1( ; | ) ; | )
| ( ,..., );( ,..., )
Inf | ( ,..., ) Inf | ( ,..., );( ,..., ) .
A B A E
Bit rT rT r T r T
Sec q q




  = 
   = −   B B (B B
C ξ
ξ ξ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
 
* *
( | ) 1 1
* *
ˆ ˆ1 1 1( ; | ) ; | )
| ( ,..., );( ,..., )
Inf | ( ,..., ) Inf | ( ,..., );( ,..., ) .
A B A E
Sym rT rT r T r T
Sec q q




  = 
   = −   B B (B B
C ξ
ξ ξ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
 
Obviously, in order to have a good quality and secure system it is necessary to maximize the values of






( | ) ( | ) 1 1
( ,..., )
* *
( | ) ( | ) 1 1
( ,..., )
[ ] max | ( ,,..., );( ,..., ,





opt Bit Bit rT rT r T r T
Sec Sec q q
opt Sym Sym rT rT r T r T
Sec Sec q q
l l
l l
 =  







ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
 




ˆ( ) 1 1( ; | )
* *
ˆ( ) 1 1( ; | )
[ ] Inf | ( ,..., );( ,..., ) ,
[ ] Inf | ( ,..., );( ,..., ) .
Bit Bit rT rT r T r T
Sec s q q
Sym Sym rT rT r T r T
Sec s q q
l dN l
l N l
 = −  







ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
 
In this case it is necessary to minimize values of [ ]ˆ( ; )Inf :EvaB B l  
{ }
A E A E0 1
A E A E0 1
* *
ˆ ˆ 0 0( ; | ) ( ; | )( , ,..., )
* *
ˆ ˆ 0 0( ; | ) ( ; | )( , ,..., )
Inf [ ] min Inf | ( ,..., );( ,..., ) ,





opt Bit Bit rT rT r T r T
q q




 =  
=
B B B B
B B B B
ξ ξϕ ϕ ϕ
ξ ξϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ{ }. 
 
It is naturally to introduce normed secrecy capacities 
{ }
( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ( ; | ) ; | )( | )
( | )
( | )
( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | )
Inf [ ] Inf [l][ ]
[ ]
max [ ]
1 [ ] 1 [ ] [ ] [ ],









l l l l→ → → →
= = − =
= − − − = −
B B (B BCC
C




ξ ξ ξ ξ
                 (3) 
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{ }
( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ( ; | ) ; | )( | )
( | )
( | )
( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | )
Inf [ ] Inf [l][ ]
[ ]
max [ ]
1 [ ] 1 [ ] [ ] [ ],









l l l l→ → → →
= = − =
= − − − = −
B B (B BCC
C




ξ ξ ξ ξ
                  (4) 
where 
ˆ ˆ( ; | ) ; | )
( | ) ( | )
Inf [ ] Inf [l]
[ ] 1 ,   [ ]  1 ,A B A E
Bit Bit





= − = −B B (B BBER BERξ ξξ ξ                    (5) 
ˆ ˆ( ; | ) ; | )
( | ) ( | )
Inf [ ] Inf [l]
[ ] 1 ,   [ ]  1 ,A B A E
Sym Sym





= − = −B B (B BSER SERξ ξξ ξ                     (6) 
In noiseless case we have 
ˆ; | 0)
( | 0) ( | 0)
Inf [l]
[ ] [ ] 1 [ ],A E
Bit
Bit Bit





= → == = − =
(B BC C BERξξ ξ                         (7) 
ˆ; | 0)
( | 0) ( | 0)
Inf [l]
[ ] [ ] 1 [ ],A E
Sym
Sym Sym





= → == = − =
(B BC C SERξξ ξ                         (8) 
since 
ˆ ˆ( ; | 0) ( ; | 0)
( | 0) ( | 0)
Inf [ ] Inf [ ]
1,   [ ] 0   and  1,   [ ] 0.A B A B
Bit Sym






→ = → == = = =
B B B BBER SERξ ξξ ξ  
2.2. Simulation Results 
In this subsection, we conduct computer simulations to verify the performances of our Intelligent 
OFDM-TCS, based on MPTs. Simulations have been done in MATLAB (R2012b) software. In the 
simulation, the Intelligent OFDM TCS’s parameters are assumed as follows: M-QAM modulation, 
where 82 =256M =  ( 8d = ), the length of MPWT (i.e., the number of subcarriers is 256) is =256N , 
every time-slot (OFDM-symbols) is a row from grey-level (256 256)× -image “Lena”, the number of 
time-slot equal to 256  (it is equal to the number of rows of “Lena”). The length of bit-stream of a 
single time-slot is equal to 8 256 2048× = . Data of 2048  bits are sent in the form of 256  8-bit
symbols (one symbol is of 8 bits). Data are similar between all OFDM TCS, based on MPTs and 6 
orthogonal transforms. 
Now, we provide some simulation results to substantiate our theoretical claims for MPWT with initial 
values of parameters ( ) ( )0 0 0 01 2 3 4, , , / 4, / 4, / 8, / 3 .=ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ π π π π  If parameters in orthogonal transforms 
of Alice’s and Eva’s OFDM-TCS are the same (i.e., Eve knows ( )0 0 0 01 2 3 4, , ,ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ), then 0=MSD , 
0=BER  and 0=SER . This means that Eve successful intercepts Alice’s messages. In order to 
protect corporate privacy and sensitive client information from the threat of electronic eavesdropping 
Alice and Bob use describe above defense mechanism. They change parameters  
( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 01 2 1 2 1 1 2 2, ,..., , ,..., , ,..., ,   0,1,2,... rT rT rT rT rT rTq q q q rϕ ϕ ϕ → ϕ ϕ ϕ = ϕ + ∆ϕ ϕ + ∆ϕ ϕ + ∆ϕ =  
It would be interesting to know how MSD, BER and SER are changing with respect to deviation 
( )1 2 3 4, , ,ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ  from initial values ( )0 0 0 01 2 3 4, , , .ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ   
Example. Let Alice’s and Bob’s Intel-OFDM TCS, based on MPWT has the following initial values 
of parameters ( )0 0 0 01 2 3 4, , , , , , .4 4 8 3
 =  
 
π π π πϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ  Let Alice’s transmitted message will be as: 
 “The American space agency has released a video describing the perilous journey its InSight probe will make to the 
surface of Mars later this month. Fronted by Rob Manning, the chief engineer at Nasa's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the 
film describes the various stages of what is termed "entry, descent and landing", or EDL. It is a sequence of high 
jeopardy. The agency produced a similar video for its Curiosity Mars lander in 2012 called The 7 Minutes of Terror. 
That became a viral hit. This one isn't quite so showy but is nonetheless very successful in communicating the drama of a 
landing on Mars. Launched from Earth back in May, Insight is still (Friday) a couple of million km from the Red Planet. 
Науки о данных         V.G. Labunets, D.E. Komarov et  
V Международная конференция и молодёжная школа «Информационные технологии и нанотехнологии» (ИТНТ-2019) 239 
The arrival time is fixed, says Tom Hoffman, InSight project manager at JPL. "We're going to land on November 26 at 
about 11:47 Pacific time (19:47 GMT) regardless of anything. That is, we're on a ballistic entry; we can't change it; we 
can't go back around," he told reporters this week. InSight is a static probe. In other words, it will sit still in one place; it 
will not rove around the planet like Curiosity and Nasa's other wheeled robots. It will be the first mission to focus its 
investigations predominantly on the interior of Mars.” 
If Eve knows these parameters then she receive the same message. Let now Alice sends this message 
by Intel-OFDM TCS with new parameters ( )1 1 1 1 0 0 0 01 2 3 4 1 2 3 4, , , , , ,20
 = + 
 
πϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ  and Eve receive it by 
Intel-OFDM TCS with initial parameters ( )0 0 0 01 2 3 4, , , , , , .4 4 8 3
 =  
 
π π π πϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ   In this case 0,0512=BER  
and 0,4266=SER . It means that almost half ( 42,66% ) of symbols received by Eve are erroneous: 
The Fmeri fn  v ce'agenc~ o t telease ' 'vjde'de d ibnng  he verilot 'journey'it 'InSnwht  soce wjl 'make'to {he turffce 
of'Ma   late  {hi 'mnnth. Irnnte  by&Ro 'Manni g,'{hk dhief jnginej ' t'N ta( 'Jet  toqtlsio 'L eos {osz, {he film dj drnbe 
'the'varmou 'st hes'of'wna{ n 'termek'%ent z,  et ent fnd'landinf%, n 'EDM. It'is f teqtjnce'f nigh'je v rdy. The'aien } 
wrodu jd'a'simjla 'vi j fn 'i{ 'Czri sity'Ma   lande 'in 5 61'called [xd ('Mimu{e  of'Te  os 'Tha{ eedame' 'vm al xjt. [hj ' e 
isn' 'qtite' n shovz eut m 'nnne helet 'verz ttccj  fzl in dommuni a ing {he k am  of& 'landimw m'M ts.'Latnched'fso  J tto 
d ck'in'Maz,'In nght'i  t il  /Ftidaz)' 'couvle nf mill nn k  i nm the'"jd'Plame .'The' trivbl tjme i 'fjxed  ta} 'Tom Xnffman, 
NnSiwht vroj  {'l naheu et IPL. $We'se'wninw'to'land'  Nuem j &29 et  dott'66:;'  eci m 'time .0>94''WMT. teg tT es 
'oe anzthi g. [xbt'is, vd'te'm f dalli  ic en ry;'wd dam'{ chbng 'it; vd dan't h& ac  frnund,"'he {o d'rjpnr er 'this yejk. 
InSifht n ' 's a{ic vrobj.'In'other yosds, it vill  it's il  in ne vlacj;'it will nnt'rnuj eround' ie'qlame{'like'Czrio it 'and'Na e't 
nth t whdeled tobot . It'wjl  ee'th 'fi tt'mi sion tn iocts nts nnvet igbti  ' tedolinantl  om {he mnterio 'f'M t . 
a)  b)  
c)  d)  
Figure 2. ( )iMSD ϕ  measurement  versus iϕ ( 1, 2,3,4)i = , where 1 2 3∆ = ∆ = ∆ =ϕ ϕ ϕ  4 /10= ∆ =ϕ π , 
a) 01 / 4 0,785,= ≈ϕ π  b) 
0
2 / 4 0,785= ≈ϕ π , c) 
0
3 / 8 0,3927= ≈ϕ π ,  d) 
0
4 / 3 1,047= ≈ϕ π . MPWT is 
1 2 3 42
( , , , ).n ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕWT  
 
The transmission performances of OFDM system are evaluated by average MSD, BER and SER 
measurements under 256 time-slot.  Figs. 2-4 show the average the following measurements 
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= = −∑ ∑ ∑ b bMSD MSDϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ  
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l→ = → =
=
=∑BER BERξ ξϕ ϕ   
255
( | 0) ( | 0)
0
( ) [ | ]A E i A E i
l
l→ = → =
=
=∑SER SERξ ξϕ ϕ  
versus  iϕ ( 1,2,3,4)i =  in noiseless case. It can be seen that when gradually сhanging 1 2 3 4, , ,ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ  the 
( )iMSD ϕ , ( )iBER ϕ  and ( )iSER ϕ  decreasing to maximum values in about / 4π  for ( )iMSD ϕ , 
( )iBER ϕ  and in about  / 8π  for ( )iSER ϕ .When parameters in transmitter (Alice) and receiver (Eva) 
are the same, we have 0=MSD , 0=BER  and 0=SER . This means that Eve successful intercepts 
Alice’s messages. All graphics have V -like form. It means, that if Alice and Bob change work value 
of parameters, but Eve use previous value, then Eve will receive Alice’s message with big mistakes.  
a) b)  
c)  d)  
Figure 3. ( )iBER ϕ  measurement versus iϕ ( 1,2,3,4)i = , where 1 2 3∆ = ∆ = ∆ =ϕ ϕ ϕ  4 / 10= ∆ =ϕ π , 
a) 01 / 4 0,785,= ≈ϕ π  b) 
0
2 / 4 0,785= ≈ϕ π , c) 
0
3 / 8 0,392= ≈ϕ π , d)
0
4 / 3 1,047= ≈ϕ π . MPWT is 
1 2 3 42
( , , , ).n ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕWT  
Theoretical analysis and simulation results prove that the proposed new system has better anti-
eavesdropping performance than the conventional system. 
3. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a novel Intelligent OFDM-telecommunication systems based on many-
parameter transforms (MPTs). The purpose of employing the MPT is to improve:  1) the PHY-LS of 
wireless transmissions against to the wide-band anti-jamming and anti-eavesdropping communication; 
2) the bit error rate (BER) performance with respect to the conventional OFDM-TCS; 3) the peak to 
average power ratio (PAPR). The new systems use inverse MPWT for modulation at the transmitter 
and direct MPWT for demodulation at the receiver. Each MPT depends on finite set of independent 
parameters (angles), which could be changed in dependently of one another. When parameters are 
changed, multi-parametric transform is changed too taking form of a set known (and unknown) 
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orthogonal (or unitary) transforms. The main advantage of using MPT in OFDM TCS is that it is a 
very flexible system allowing to construct Intelligent OFDM TCS for electronic warfare (EW). EW 
consists of suppressor (Eve) and protector (Alice and Bob). Suppressor aims to “reduce the 
effectiveness” of enemy forces, including command and control and their use of weapons systems, and 
targets enemy communications and reconnaissance by changing the “quality and speed” of 
information processes. In reverse, EW in defense (Alice&Bob) protects such assets and those of 
friendly forces. 
a)  b)  
c)  d)  
Figure 4. ( )iSER ϕ measurement  versus  iϕ ( 1,2,3,4)i = , where 1 2∆ = ∆ =ϕ ϕ  3 4 / 10= ∆ = ∆ =ϕ ϕ π , 
a) 01 / 4 0,785,= ≈ϕ π  b) 
0
2 / 4 0,785= ≈ϕ π , c) 
0
3 / 8 0,392,= ≈ϕ π d)
0
4 / 3 1,047= ≈ϕ π . MPT is 
1 2 1 2 3 42 2
( , ,..., ) ( , , , ).n q n=ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕU WT  
  
A legitimate user (Alice) transmits her confidential messages to a legitimate receiver (Bob), while Eve 
will be trying to eavesdrop Alice’s information. Alice transmits her data using OFDM with N  many-








i.e. she use the unitary transform 
0 0
1( ,..., )N qϕ ϕWT  with fixed parameters 
0 0
1 ,..., qϕ ϕ . When sub-carriers { }
10 0
1 0






ϕ ϕ   of Alice’s 
and Bob’s Intelligent-OFDM-TCS are identified by Eve this TCS can be eavesdropped by means of 
radio-electronic eavesdropping attack.). As an anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming measures, Alice 
and Bob can use the following strategy:  they can select new sub-carriers by changing parameters in 
1( ,..., )N qϕ ϕWT  in the periodical (or in pseudo random) manner 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 0 0 0 01 2 1 2 1 1 2 2, ,..., , ,..., , ,..., ,rT rT rT rT rT rTq q q qϕ ϕ ϕ → ϕ ϕ ϕ = ϕ + ∆ϕ ϕ + ∆ϕ ϕ + ∆ϕ 0,1,2,... r = , 
where ( )0 0 01 2, ,..., qϕ ϕ ϕ  are initial values of parameters at the initial time 0t ,  T  is the period of changing 
parameters. Theoretical analysis and simulation results prove that the proposed new system has better 
anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming performances than the conventional OFDM-TCS, based on 
DFT.  
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